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5.1  Introduction 
Understanding the determinants of foreign direct investment is important for 
analyzing capital flows and the industrial organization of multinational firms. 
Most empirical studies of foreign direct investment, however, have focused on 
case studies of nontax factors in overseas investment decisions or on discerning 
reduced-form relationships between some measure of  direct investment and 
variables relating to nontax and tax aspects of the investment decision. These 
studies (which we review in section 5.2) have helped to assess the qualitative 
effects of  changes in underlying determinants on firms’ overseas investment 
activities. It is more difficult, we argue below, to infer structural links between 
tax parameters and foreign direct investment in existing studies. Our interest 
in investigating those structural links stems both from a desire to extend mod- 
els of foreign direct investment and from a concern that policymakers’ consid- 
eration of using tax instruments to influence foreign direct investment requires 
a more formal empirical analysis. 
At one level, this task is straightforward. A number of authors have related 
tax parameters in “home” (residence) and “host” (source) countries to financial 
variables such as the cost of capital or Tobin’s q. Given such relationships, one 
could extend and exploit conventional neoclassical investment models devel- 
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oped to explain firms’ domestic investment decisions to estimate effects of tax 
parameters on outbound or inbound foreign direct investment. 
In practice, this exercise is not so easy. Studies of effects of tax parameters 
on (generally inbound) U.S. foreign direct investment have relied on aggre- 
gated (by country) data on investment flows calculated by the Bureau of Eco- 
nomic Analysis. Because these data do not distinguish between new  capital 
investment and acquisitions of existing assets, it is difficult to use them in tests 
of formal models of investment decisions. Given our interest in the effects of 
tax policy on foreign direct investment, this definitional problem is a signifi- 
cant one. In particular, Auerbach and Hassett (1993) have noted that the conse- 
quences of  neglecting the different tax treatments of  the two forms of U.S. 
inbound foreign direct investment are substantial. 
In this paper, we examine the effects of taxation on foreign direct investment 
using previously unexplored (for this purpose) panel data on outbound foreign 
direct investment by subsidiaries of U.S. multinational firms collected by Com- 
pustat’s Geographic Segment file project. These firm-level data contain infor- 
mation on new  capital investment overseas, which enable us to measure tax 
influences on foreign direct investment more precisely and allow us to focus 
on structural models of  subsidiaries’ new  investment decisions. The paper is 
organized as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the existing empirical literature on 
the determinants of  foreign direct investment. Our model of  the effect of tax 
and nontax factors on firms’ foreign direct investment decisions is presented 
in section 5.3. Section 5.4 describes the panel data on multinational parent 
firms and their foreign subsidiaries that we use to estimate the model. We ana- 
lyze empirical results for U.S. outbound foreign direct investment in section 
5.5 and discuss in section 5.6  implications of  those results for analyzing the 
role of  tax  policy in firms’ overseas investment decisions. Section 5.7 con- 
cludes. 
5.2  Empirical Literature on FDI 
Existing empirical studies of  foreign direct  investment (FDI) reflect re- 
searchers’ interest in industrial organization or taxation.’ Industrial organiza- 
tion inquiries have generally ignored tax considerations and analyzed FDI as 
being  governed by  firms’ desire to exploit the value of  ownership-specific 
assets (such as valuable intangibles) or location-specific advantages (related to 
sourcing or marketing). Empirical research has  centered on  reduced-form, 
cross-sectional tests of  FDI in a particular sector as a product of proxies for 
ownership-specific and  location-specific variables (see, e.g., the  studies in 
Dunning 1985).*  Public finance inquiries have focused on the role of differen- 
1. An exception is the survey in Caves (1982), which discusses both considerations. 
2. Two other “industrial organization” approaches have also appeared in the literature. Wilson 
(1993) has used case studies to examine the roles played by  nontax and tax considerations  in 125  Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment 
tial tax treatment as determining the source and location of FDI, holding con- 
stant nontax  determinant^.^ 
A significant body of empirical research by  public finance economists has 
emphasized effects of taxation on FDI into the United States. This literature 
has generally examined reduced-form relationships between capital flows and 
measures of after-tax rates of return or  effective tax rates on capital income. 
Several studies have used annual aggregate data for FDI financed by subsid- 
iary  earnings and parent  company transfers of  funds, following Hartman’s 
(1981, 1984, 1985)  contribution^.^ Hartman used as a theoretical benchmark 
the “tax capitalization” approach to analyzing firms’ dividend and investment 
decisions (see the derivation in King 1977; Auerbach 1979; Bradford 1981).5 
In that approach, dividend payouts are a residual in firm decisions. Payout ra- 
tios  do not  affect firms’ required  rate of  return on  equity, and permanent 
changes in individual tax rates do not affect dividend payouts or the cost of 
capital. In the context of  FDI, these implications permit Hartman to ignore 
effects of (at least permanent changes in) home-country tax parameters on FDI 
in “mature” subsidiaries-that  is, those paying dividends to their parent firms.6 
We return to this issue in section 5.3. 
Hartman (1984) estimated the effects of U.S. inbound FDI of changes in the 
after-tax rates of return received by foreign investors in U.S. inbound FDI and 
by investors in U.S. capital generally, with the intent of measuring impacts of 
shifts in returns to new FDI. He also includes as an explanatory variable the 
tax rate on U.S. capital owned by  foreign investors relative to that owned by 
U.S. investors.’ His estimated models do not incorporate measures of  U.S. 
withholding taxes, foreign income taxes, or rates of return on non-U.S. invest- 
ments. 
location decisions. In a different vein, Froot and Stein (1991) study the influence of capital-market 
imperfections on the source of FDI. 
3. Theoretical analyses in this vein include Gersovitz (1987) and Alworth (1988). We review 
empirical studies below. For overviews of systems for taxing income from FDI, see Auk and Brad- 
ford (l990), Frisch (1990), Hines and Hubbard (1990), U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation (1990, 
1991). and U.S. Department of the Treasury (1993). 
4. Hartman used data on FDI for  1965-79,  provided by  the Bureau of  Economic Analysis 
(BEA); the data are separated according to whether investment was financed by subsidiary retained 
earnings or transfers from foreign parent companies. 
5. Sinn (1984) also demonstrated that retention-financed investments by  subsidiaries are inde- 
pendent of home-country tax parameters. The work of Hartman and Sinn built on the earlier work 
by Horst (1977), who maintained that a subsidiary’s cost of  capital depended on both home- and 
host-country tax parameters when profits are remitted. 
6. This prediction is more suitably applied to firm-level data than to aggregate FDI  data, of 
course. The tax capitalization approach suggests that a mature subsidiary’s investment financed by 
retained earnings is unaffected by the home-country tax rate. This suggestion is not equivalent to 
a claim that aggregate investment out of retained earnings will not be affected by the home-country 
tax rate. 
7. Hartman intends this last variable to proxy for effects on asset valuation of taxes applying 
only to U.S. investors. (Changes in the valuation of assets affect the cost of investing for potential 
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Using the log of the ratio of FDI to U.S. GNP as the dependent variable,x 
Hartman’s results indicate that the FDI-GNP ratio increases as the after-tax 
rates of return rise and decreases as the relative tax rate on foreigners rises. 
The variables have the expected sign, though explanatory power was much 
better for investment financed by  subsidiary retained earnings. These sugges- 
tive findings indicate that taxes are an important determinant of FDI. 
Hartman’s  study provoked many subsequent rounds of replication  and re- 
finement. Employing the rate-of-return series calculated by Feldstein and Jun 
(1987), Boskin and Gale (1987) reestimate Hartman’s model using data over 
the period  1956-84.  While their results vary across specifications and time 
periods, they are qualitatively consistent with Hartman’s original findings. 
In his dissertation, Newlon (1987) reconsiders and extends the earlier analy- 
ses of  Hartman and of  Boskin and Gale (1987). After correcting miscalcula- 
tions in the FDI data from the BEA (for the years 1965-73),  Newlon reestim- 
ates the specifications used by earlier authors and finds that the model relating 
the log of the FDI-GNP ratio to after-tax rates of  return on transfers of funds 
fits better, though the model for investment financed by retained earnings fits 
more poorly. When Newlon uses data over the 1956-84 period, his results de- 
part from those of  Hartman  and Boskin  and Gale. He finds no statistically 
significant estimated  coefficient that  explains FDI  financed by  transfers  of 
funds. 
These studies are important advances in our understanding of the effects of 
taxation on FDI. A number of concerns arise, however. An obvious one relates 
to problems of inference using reduced-form models and highly aggregated 
data; we return to this in section 5.3 and 5.4. A second relates to the omission 
of home-country tax rates from the analysis (see, e.g., Slemrod 1990, discussed 
below). Third, nontax determinants of  FDI are not explicitly modeled. Fourth, 
Newlon (1987) and others have noted a problem in interpreting the coefficient 
on the rate of  return on FDI financed by  retained  earnings. As long as the 
home-country taxes worldwide income using a foreign tax credit and deferral, 
a subsidiary is likely to finance investment first by using retained earnings. In 
this case, when the subsidiary’s desired investment exceeds its retained earn- 
ings, the subsidiary will retain all of its income; that is, required earnings and 
income will be equal. This could lead to a spurious correlation between invest- 
ment financed out of retained earnings and the rate of return (where the numer- 
ator of the latter is effectively retained earnings).y Finally, the FDI data sup- 
plied  by  the  BEA  suffer  two  drawbacks,  even  accepting  their  level  of 
8. Young (1988) relaxes the assumption that the GNP elasticity of  U.S. inbound FDI is unity. 
With this modification, and using revised data over the  1956-84  period, he estimates a smaller 
(though still statistically significant) response of  FDI  financed by  retained earnings to the after- 
tax  rate of  return, confirming Hartman’s result. Young finds no evidence that taxes affect FDI 
financed by transfers of new funds. 
9. The problem is even more general; the spurious correlation can arise even in cases where the 
subsidiary follows any fixed rule for determining dividend payments out of current earnings, as 
noted by Newlon (1987). 127  Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment 
aggregation: (1) as noted  in the introduction, they  measure financial flows 
rather than new capital investment per se;Io  and (2)  they are based on periodic 
benchmark surveys, raising the possibility that FDI flows are more mismea- 
sured the further is the observation from a benchmark year." 
Slemrod (1990) addresses some of these concerns, while still relying on the 
data on FDI provided by  the BEA.'*  He disaggregates the data on FDI into the 
United States by  seven countries-Canada,  France, Italy, Japan, the Nether- 
lands, the United Kingdom, and (the former) West Germany. He also makes 
three departures from the approaches used by earlier authors. First, he controls 
for a richer set of  nontax variables, including the ratio of  U.S. GDP to the 
combined GDP of the seven investing countries (to capture impacts of chang- 
ing market sizes), the prime-age-male unemployment rate in the United States 
and the weighted average of the unemployment rates in the seven investing 
countries (to capture impacts on FDI of  business cycles), the real effective 
exchange rate of the U.S. dollar against the GDP-weighted average of the cur- 
rencies of the seven investing countries (to capture impacts of changes in rela- 
tive costs of  production), and adjustments to address potential measurement 
error in FDI (see n. 11 above). 
Second, he uses measures of effective tax rates on corporate investment in 
the United States (calculated by Auerbach and Hines 1988) instead of  mea- 
sures of after-tax returns. Third, he includes lagged as well as contemporane- 
ous measures of this tax rate concept (appealing to "time to build" arguments). 
Slemrod's principal findings are as follows. Considering the seven countries 
together, he concludes that: (1) the marginal effective tax rate in the United 
States has  a  negative  and  statistically significant  effect  on  total  FDI  and 
transfer-financed FDI; (2)  these estimated impacts of  the marginal effective 
tax rate are not robust to the inclusion of the weighted-average foreign unem- 
ployment rate (which is itself positively related to FDI into the United States); 
10.  As constructed by the BEA, FDI includes purchases of existing assets by foreign investors, 
while it excludes investment raised in the host country or in third countries. The analysis in Auer- 
bach and Hassett (1993) suggests that a significant proportion  of  U.S. inbound FDI is related 
to acquisitions. 
11. Slemrod (1990) attempts to address the concerns about the official FDI data. To  adjust for 
potential measurements error in FDI  on account of the benchmark procedure, he includes in mod- 
els of FDI  (described below) two dummy variables. The first represents the difference between 
the year for which the data are provided and the year in which the most recent benchmark survey 
was conducted. The second relates to the post-1974 period as a proxy for once-and-for-all modifi- 
cations of definitions and concepts relating to FDI carried out by the BEA in 1974. 
12. Using aggregate data on FDI over the 1956-84  period considered by earlier authors, Slem- 
rod first reestimates existing models. He then explores effects of pretax rates of return and tax 
rates separately. For FDI financed by retained earnings, he finds that the estimated coefficients on 
tax terms are insignificantly different from zero; for FDI financed by transfers of funds, the esti- 
mated coefficients on tax terms have the expected sign and are significantly different from zero. 
These results are the opposite of those in Hartman (1984). When Slemrod uses the marginal effec- 
tive corporate tax rate on investment calculated  by  Auerbach and Hines (1988) (instead of the 
average tax rate), he finds that the marginal effective tax rate has a statistically significant effect 
on transfer-financed FDI but not on retention-financed FDI. 128  Jason G. Cummins and R. Glenn Hubbard 
(3) of the nontax variables, the relative GDP measures, the U.S. unemployment 
rate, and the FDI measurement adjustment have no statistically significant im- 
pact on FDI; and (4)  the real effective dollar exchange rate has a negative and 
statistically significant impact on inbound FDI.I3  When he groups the countries 
into those with worldwide (foreign tax credit) and those with temtorial (ex- 
emption) systems, Slemrod’s results fail to support predictable differences in 
the tax sensitivity of FDI between the two  group^.'^ 
While Slemrod’s contribution addresses some of the concerns raised in the 
empirical literature, it raises others. For example, there are questions about the 
merits of Slemrod’s approach to the problem of spurious correlation between 
retention-financed FDI and after-tax rates of return (see Hartman 1990). Sec- 
ond, as noted earlier, the BEA data do not allow one to distinguish new invest- 
ment and acquisitions in FDI. Finally, the approach does not suggest a struc- 
tural model, which could be used for policy inference. 
In the next section, we develop a simple structural model to study new FDI 
by  individual firms. As the reader will likely note in that section and in the 
following section describing the firm-level panel data we use, our approach 
also requires many simplifying assumptions. In our view, however, the applica- 
tion of  standard, theoretical investment models to firms’ decisions offers the 
best hope of assessing effects of home-country and host-country tax systems 
on FDI.I5 
5.3  Modeling Effects of Taxes on FDI 
5.3.1  Basic Issues 
In a world of ideal data, assessing the impact of taxation on firms’ FDI deci- 
sions would be straightforward.16  In the q-theory approach, for example, in- 
vestment I of parent firm i in subsidiary  j  at time r relative to that subsidiary’s 
capital stock K, under certain conditions,” depends linearly on that subsid- 
iary’s marginal q, appropriately adjusted for tax considerations.18  That is, 
13. While  possibly  consistent  with  the  low-relative-production-cost  explanation  offered  by 
Slemrod (see also Pugel 1985). this result is also considered with the capital-market-imperfection 
explanation offered by Froot and Stein (1991): a low value of the dollar increases the dollar value 
of foreign investors’ net worth, enabling them to offer more collateral and obtain more funds to 
finance investment in the United States. 
14. Such apparent insensitivity could reflect problems in the specification or the tax rate mea- 
sure, or, in addition, the use of techniques for intertemporal tax minimization. 
15. This exercise is similar in spirit to the study of subsidiary dividend repatriation decisions in 
Hines and Hubbard (1990) and Altshuler, Newlon, and Randolph (chap. 9 in this volume). 
16. For the purpose of this analysis, we are ignoring some cost considerations associated with 
the choice of capacity. 
17. The necessary assumptions include perfect competition, constant returns to scale technolog- 
ies, and quadratic adjustment costs; see, e.g., Hayashi (1982) and Summers (1981). 
18.There is nothing special about the q-formulation of the investment demand equation; one 
could use the cost of capital formulation as well (see, e.g., Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard 1994). 
Altshuler and Fulghieri (1990) illustrate the effects of home- and host-country tax parameters and 
the parent’s tax status on a subsidiary’s cost of capital. 129  Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment 
where a and b are parameters to be estimated and E is an expectational error. 
Home-country and host-country tax parameters have been incorporated in 
theoretical definitions of the subsidiary’s marginal q by Alworth (1988), Alt- 
shuler and Fulghieri (1994), Jun (1990), and others, under different assump- 
tions about the taxing regime, dividend policy, and foreign tax credit status of 
the parent (in countries with worldwide tax systems). In this abstraction, we 
could estimate a and b, thereby permitting a calculation of elasticities of invest- 
ment demand with respect to various tax parameters influencing multinational 
firms’ FDI decisions. We  could also compare the reasonableness of estimates 
of a and b with parameters estimated from firm-level data on domestic invest- 
ment by  similarly situated firms in home and host countries. 
Unfortunately, this ideal is not particularly useful as a practical guide to 
estimating effects of taxation on the level of firms’ FDI. First, it is difficult to 
develop a proxy for marginal q under the best of  circumstance^.^^ For FDI, a 
further complication arises because location-specific effects on the subsid- 
iary’s q cannot be captured by using available data to construct the parent’s q, 
and values of subsidiary-specific q’s are not observable. 
To reduce these problems, while using the same basic structural strategy as 
that just described, we use the Euler equation approach to estimate the respon- 
siveness of  investment to tax parameters (see, e.g., Abel  1980; Hubbard and 
Kashyap 1992). As we discuss below, this approach has fewer informational 
requirements than the conventional q-theory representation used in the empiri- 
cal investment literature. Nonetheless, it permits estimation of the same struc- 
tural parameters in the foregoing example so that we  can still ask: Given a 
change in a tax parameter, how does a subsidiary’s marginal q change, and 
how does FDI change? The approach also permits consideration of expounded 
models in which “net worth” changes can affect FDI (see, e.g., Gertler and 
Hubbard 1988; Froot and Stein 1991). 
5.3.2  Euler Equation Approach 
Analyzing investment demand begins with an expression for the value to the 
parent i of the foreign subsidiary jZ0  The after-tax return to the parent firm at 
time t reflects capital appreciation and current dividends.21  In equilibrium, this 
return equals the return pUr: 
19. See the discussion in Hayashi (1982) and Hubbard and Kashyap (1992). 
20. The derivation herein expands on Hubbard and Kashyap (1992) and Hubbard, Kashyap, and 
Whited (1995). 
21. For simplicity, we consider one majority-owned subsidiary per parent; we are thereby ab- 
stracting from tax-minimizing strategies available to parent firms with multiple subsidiaries. We 
are also abstracting from parent investment through third-party conduits located in neither the 
parent’s country nor the subsidiary’s country. 130  Jason G. Cummins and R. Glenn Hubbard 
where V is the value of the subsidiary at time t, S denotes the value of parent 
equity transfers, t'  is the effective tax rate on subsidiary earnings retained and 
invested abroad, and E, is the expectation operator conditional on information 
known at time t. (The after-tax capital gain to the parent firm thus consists of 
the change in the value of the subsidiary less the component of this change due 
to parent transfers.)  Subsidiary j's dividends to its parent  i at time t + 1 are 
DV,,+,,  and f" is the tax rate on those dividends. This derivation follows the tax 
capitalization view of the dividend decision (see the discussion in section 5.2), 
in which the required rate of return for equity investment in the subsidiary is 
independent of the subsidiary's dividend policy. 
In the absence of any bubbles, solving equation (1) forward yields the fol- 
lowing expression for the subsidiary's  value at time zero, where p,,  is the ap- 
propriate one-period discount factor: 
The subsidiary maximizes equation (2) subject to five constraints.22  The first 
is the capital stock accounting identity: 
(3) 
where KVf  is the capital stock of  subsidiary j at time t, I,], is its investment at 
time t, and 6 is the (assumed constant) rate of economic depreciation. 
The second constraint defines dividends. Cash inflows include sales, parent 
equity transfers, and net borrowing, while cash outflows consist of dividends, 
variable factor and interest payments, and investment expenditures: 
(4) 
where 
K,/, = I,, + (1 -  6) 
DIJI  = (1 -  TJJ [F(Y,,,-,  3  NZ,J -  W,,N,/, -  9 (ItJI?  KtJ,,-  I) -  jv,,-  I 
BtJ  I-11  + Stp  + Br,r  -  (1 -  ~;r) Byr-1 -  ~yr  (1 -  kJr -  TjrZ,r)'t,r  7 
N,J,  = 
w,,  = 
B, = 
i,,  = 
T;,  = 
P,~,  = 
a vector of variable factors of production  for subsidiary j 
at time t; 
a vector of real factor prices for subsidiary j at time t; 
the real value of net debt outstanding for subsidiary j at 
time t;23 
nominal interest rate paid on subsidiary j's debt at time t; 
expected rate of inflation at time t (in currency in which 
subsidiary j borrows); 
subsidiary j's price of capital goods at time t relative to the 
price of output at time t; 
22. We are assuming that the parent firm  has a controlling interest in the subsidiary. 
23. This setup implicitly assumes that the subsidiary's debt can be obtained on identical terms 
from different sources and that the parent cannot successfully disguise repatriation of profits in- 
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T~,  = 
k,, = 
z., = 
,  NJ  = 
corporate income tax rate in the host country for subsidiary 
j  at time t; 
investment tax credit in the host country applying to sub- 
sidiary j at time t; 
present value of one dollar of depreciation allowances in 
the host country applying to subsidiary j at time t; 
subsidiary's real net revenue function (F, > 0, FKK  < 0); 
and 
F(Kij, 
The third and fourth constraints restrict dividends and parent equity trans- 
fers, respectively, to be nonnegative: 
(5)  D,,  0 
(6)  qJf  2 0. 
and 
The fifth constraint is a transversality condition that prevents the firm from 
borrowing an infinite amount to pay dividends: 
Let A,  be the series of Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraint 
(5), and let m,J,  represent the ratio (1 -  t",J/(  1 -  tr,J  Substituting equation (4) 
into equation (2) for Do,, and using equation (3) to eliminate I,, from the prob- 
lem, the first-order condition for the subsidiary's capital stock (KJ can be ex- 
pressed as 
To  obtain an equation for investment, it is necessary to parameterize the 
adjustment cost function, $(Z,JI,  The tradition in the q-theory literature 
has been to specify adjustment costs that are linearly homogenous in invest- 
ment and capital, so that marginal and average q are equal (see Hayashi 1982). 
A convenient parameterization adhering to these constraints is 
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where the bliss point in the adjustment cost function is given by w,.  By differ- 
entiating equation (9) with respect to I,[  and K,Jt,  and substituting these results 
into (8), we obtain 
We assume that expectations are rational and allow for an expectational er- 
ror, ei,,+l.  where E,(e,,t+l)  = 0 and Et(ezl,t+,)  = a:.  The error is uncorrelated with 
any information known at time t, thereby  allowing us to reexpress equation 
For the cases mentioned below, we will use the generalized method of mo- 
ments (GMM) to test for misspecification of equation (1 1). With a set of instru- 
mental variables that are orthogonal to the error term, the orthogonality condi- 
tions should not be rejected for equation (1  1). 
Our strategy is as follows. We estimate the model in equation (1 1) using data 
on FDI in foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms (described below) and proceed 
in two steps, producing GMM estimates of the underlying parameters under 
alternative assumptions that tax variables are omitted from or included in the 
model. Assuming that we have appropriately modeled the subsidiary’s invest- 
ment decision (and chosen appropriate instrumental variables), if tax consider- 
ations are important, parameter estimates should be implausible in the “no tax” 
version, and the model’s orthogonality conditions should be rejected. On the 
other hand, we expect more plausible parameter estimates when tax considera- 
tions are properly specified, and the model’s orthogonality conditions should 
not be rejected. Successful estimation of the model’s parameters then enables 
us to return to the q-theoretic experiment suggested in section 5.3: What is the 
predicted effect on outbound FDI of changes in domestic and foreign tax pa- 
rameters? 133  Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment 
5.3.3  Econometric Estimation 
Two general issues arise in the estimation of equation (1  1). First, the model 
is nonlinear in both the parameters and the ratio of  investment to the capital 
stock. Moreover, there is a simultaneity problem because of  the presence of 
the expected marginal product of capital in the model. These two considera- 
tions argue for GMM estimati~n.~~ 
Second, given the industrial organization considerations discussed in section 
5.2, we want to allow for the possibility of firm-specific and time-specific ef- 
fects. We include year dummies to deal with the latter. Because of the presence 
of the lagged dependent variable in equation (I  l), the standard practice of ac- 
counting for firm-specific effects by removing the means from the variables in 
the model will violate the orthogonality conditions used to identify the model. 
Instead, we first-difference equation (1  1) and then use twice-lagged instru- 
ments, which will still be orthogonal to the moving-average error that the dif- 
ferencing creates. 
5.4  TheData 
5.4.1  Panel Data on FDI 
The data set is constructed from the Compustat Geographic Segment file. 
Approximately 6,500 companies report information from their foreign opera- 
tions, segregated by geographic segment. Both U.S.- and foreign-incorporated 
firms report sales, operating income, and fixed assets. Up to four geographic 
regions are reported for seven years at a time. We  combine two seven-year 
panels to obtain a data set extending from 1980 to 1991. There is no require- 
ment by either the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) or the SEC 
regarding the groupings for geographic areas. As a result, the degree of speci- 
ficity among company reports varies. For example, consider two companies 
operating in the same countries. Company A might report four different geo- 
graphic areas: France, Germany, Canada, and Asia. Company B might report 
two different geographic areas: France and Europe, and “other foreign.” 
The accounting literature stresses that considerable caution should be exer- 
cised in making inferences about data reported for regions and for groups of 
countries (see, e.g, Pointer and Doupnik 1993). No conclusions about their 
relative importance can be made from the data. Consider company B again. It 
is not necessarily the case that one can isolate its French operations since it 
24. The GMM technique minimizes a quadratic objective function that has an optimal weighting 
matrix based on initial parameter estimates. The model will be overidentified as long as the number 
of instrumental variables used exceeds the number of parameters to be estimated. The test is for- 
mulated as fallows: Under the null hypothesis of orthogonality of the instruments and the error 
terms, the product of the minimized value of the objective function and the number of observations 
is distributed as a x2 statistic with n degrees of freedom, where n is the difference between the 
numbers of instruments and parameters. The overidentifying restrictions are rejected if the x2  value 
is higher than a critical value. 134  Jason G. Cummins and R. Glenn Hubbard 
reports them first and aggregates all its other European operations. In  con- 
structing the panel, we minimize this problem by taking the most conservative 
course. We  include only geographic segments when a single country is re- 
ported. While this strategy reduces the number of observations, it increases 
data quality and accuracy. 
A second pitfall in using geographic segment data is that it is sometimes 
impossible to obtain data in a manner consistent with official definitions be- 
cause of  a company’s method of  reporting. This is, of  course, a problem in 
constructing any firm-level panel data; it deserves special mention here be- 
cause companies have more than the usual latitude in what they include in the 
data. For example, excise taxes might be  included in sales, or the value of 
intangibles might be included in fixed assets. We  mitigate the problem by iso- 
lating discrepancies from data footnotes. Nevertheless, we emphasize that care 
is required in constructing variables from these data. 
The data are better understood by  knowing their genesis. Geographic seg- 
ment disclosures are mandated by  Statement  of Financial Accounting  Stan- 
dards No.  14-Financial  Reporting  of  Segments  in  a  Business  Enterprise 
(SFAS  14), issued in  1976.25  SFAS 14 was designed to provide information 
useful for evaluating the nature of  the firm’s investment and production deci- 
sions but to allow discretion in defining reportable segments and in employing 
coarse definitions. SFAS 14 requires firms to disclose information about for- 
eign sales, income, and fixed assets if foreign operations account for 10 percent 
or more of a firm’s revenues or assets. The directive became effective for com- 
panies with fiscal years ending after December 15, 1976. Two notes should be 
made about data extending to 1976. Segment data through fiscal years ending 
in 1979 contain many classification adjustments consistent with a learning pro- 
cess. Moreover, there appears to be little gain from extending samples before 
1979, because of the paucity of  data. As a result of  these considerations, we 
begin our sample in 1980. 
In addition to the pitfalls considered above, two more subtle issues arise in 
using the geographic segment data. First, as we noted in the introduction, to 
understand properly the effect of taxes on FDI, the “new investment” compo- 
nent must be separated from the “mergers and acquisitions” component. This 
is a potentially serious problem in these data, since reporting requirements are 
broad and data definitions are coarse. While practitioners’ advice mitigated 
our  we took two additional steps in the data construction to mini- 
mize any potential contamination. First, as is typical in the investment litera- 
ture, we deleted major capital stock changes to eliminate clear discontinuities 
in the identity of the firm. Second, the geographic segment file provides a foot- 
25. See, e.g.,  the discussions in Senteney and Bazaz (1992) and Pointer and Doupnik (1993). 
26. In a private communication, Donald Kirk, chairman of the FASB when SFAS 14 was prom- 
ulgated, explained to us that firms usually do not record the acquisition of capital through mergers 
and acquisitions in their geographic segment report. Debbie  Compton, senior data manager at 
Standard 62 Poor’s Compustat, confirmed that Compustat geographic segment data typically do 
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note if the data reflect the results of  a merger or acquisition; we deleted firms 
recording this footnote. 
A second potential problem is that geographic segment data are reported in 
U.S. dollars. Since currency fluctuations could misrepresent the value of  the 
foreign subsidiary’s data, it is necessary to determine when geographic seg- 
ment data are converted to dollars. For the purposes of SFAS 14, firms typi- 
cally convert the data when balance sheets are prepared at fiscal year end.27 
5.4.2 
We  construct the variables used in the econometric estimation as follows. 
The subsidiary’s sales are defined as reported net  sales for that geographic 
segment. The subsidiary’s cash flow is defined as the sum of its operating profit 
and, if  available, its depreciation; gross investment is the change in the gross 
stock of  tangible fixed assets. Each of  the above variables is divided by  the 
beginning-of-period value of tangible fixed assets. We  assume that the subsid- 
iary’s capital stock depreciation rate and nominal cost of borrowing is equal to 
those of its parent firm,  which we calculated elsewhere, in Cummins, Hassett, 
and Hubbard (1994). Host-country tax variables (investment tax credit, depre- 
ciation allowances, corporate income tax rate, and withholding tax rate) are 
taken from Cummins, Harris, and Hassett (chap. 7 in this volume). A detailed 
discussion of their construction is provided therein with accompanying tables. 
The price of  capital goods is the host country’s investment price deflator. All 
variables are deflated by  the host country’s GDP deflator. 
Tables 5.1-5.4  summarize our data on U.S. firm’s outbound FDI; the con- 
struction of variables is described therein and below. 
Table 5.1 indicates the number of U.S. foreign subsidiaries reporting infor- 
mation in the Compustat data. Countries for which Compustat reports data are 
Canada, the United Kingdom, (the former West) Germany, France, Japan, and 
Australia. Data are available over the time period 1980-91. While the number 
of subsidiaries reporting information varies from year to year (generally grow- 
ing over the period), we are able to obtain investment and operating informa- 
tion on 282-632  U.S. foreign subsidiaries. 
Tables  5.2-5.4  report  summary statistics for  subsidiary investment,  op- 
erating income, and sales, respectively. The entries in table 5.2 represent the 
mean value for year t  of  the ratio of  investment (Z,) to beginning-of-period 
capital stock (K,-,).28  The means are calculated using the values of the subsid- 
Constructing Variables Used in the Estimation 
27. We  thank Donald Kirk for explaining this point to us. Debbie Compton again confirmed 
that Compustat believes that the data are converted in this way. 
28. Since the geographic segment file data are reported in US. dollars, one must confront the 
issue of exchange rate shifts in calculating gross investment as the first-difference in the dollar- 
valued capital stock. One approach-which  is used to generate the estimated results reported in 
section 5.5-is  to construct I/K data from the dollar-valued capital stock data. Alternatively, one 
could convert the capital stock data into year-end foreign-currency equivalents in constructing 
I/K, As  we describe below in n.  35, our empirical results are not significantly affected by  this 
change. Neither approach is precisely correct because, in principle, investment should be valued 
in foreign-currency terms as it is made over the year. 136  Jason G. Cummins and R. Glenn Hubbard 
Table 5.1  Number of U.S. Foreign Subsidiaries in Sample 
United 

































































































Source; Authors’ calculations. 
Table 5.2  Mean I,/K,-, of U.S. Foreign Subsidiaries 
United 

























































































Source: Authors’ calculations 
Note: I, is gross investment. 
iary capital stocks as weights. The “operating income” entries in table 5.3 rep- 
resent the (capital-stock-weighted) mean values of the ratio of operating in- 
come to  the  beginning-of-period  capital  stock  for  the  various  years  and 
countries.  The  “sales”  entries  in  table  5.4  represent  the  (capital-stock- 
weighted) mean values of the ratio of sales to the beginning-of-period capital 
stock for the various years and countries. 
We used three alternative approaches to constructing 8. First, we assumed 
that p = 0.95, that is, an implicit real after-tax annual required rate of return 
of  5.3 percent. (Setting p equal to 0.90 or 0.99 did not significantly affect our 137  Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment 
Table 5.3  Mean Cash Flow,lK,_l  of US.  Foreign Subsidiaries 
United 

























































































Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Nore: Cashflow, is the sum of operating profit and, if available, depreciation. 
Table 5.4  Mean Sales,lK,_,  of U.S. Foreign Subsidiaries 
United 
Year  Canada  Kingdom  Germany  France  Japan  Australia  Total 
1981  1 .55 
1982  1.29 
1983  1.44 
1984  1.49 
1985  1.46 
1986  1.57 
1987  1.60 
1988  1.55 
1989  1.46 
1990  1.38 























1  SO  ,808 
1.33  1.59 
,476  1.63 
1.15  1.96 
2.03  2.19 
1.47  I .97 
1.29  1.85 
1.88  2.07 
1.69  I .68 
2.03  1.72 
1.80  I .80 
1.23  1.51 
1.54  1.34 
1.30  1.43 
1.08  1.47 
1.12  1  SO 
1.27  1.62 
,935  1.57 
1.38  1.53 
1.31  1.52 
.992  1.47 
,948  1.37 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Sales, is net sales. 
results.) Second, we  used data on firms’ interest rates, aggregate surveys of 
expected inflation, and corporate tax rates to construct data on p. Finally, we 
treated p as a parameter to be estimated. 
Because the data we used contain no information about subsidiary dividend 
repatriations, we  begin by  assuming that  subsidiaries are repatriating divi- 
dends, so that X  = 0. We  also examine separately a subset of  subsidiaries in 
the data over the entire period (as a proxy for “mature” subsidiaries, for which 
our “A = 0” assumption may be more innocuous). 
Finally, to construct m,  we use values for the tax on current repatriations td 138  Jason G. Cummins and R. Glenn Hubbard 
Table 5.5  Tax Rate on Repatriations of Overseas Earnings from U.S. FDI, f‘ 
Tax Systema  P 
Classical 
Excess limit parent  (70s -  TJ)/(l -  7,) 
Excess credit parent  w, 
Split-rate 
Excess limit parent  (T~~  -  T,)([ -  7,) + T~ -  T” + d (7, -  T,J (1 -  T,,J/(~ -  T,)~ 
Excess credit parent 
Excess limit parent 
Td -  Tu + w, 
(1 + a,)  ((Tus-  T,)/[l -  7, -  a,d,(‘  -  Tus)l/([ -  7,)’) -  a, 
Imputation 
Excess credit parent  (1 + a,)  w,  -  0, 
Notes:  T~~ = U.S. corporate tax rate, T, = corporate tax rate in host country j,  w,  = withholding 
tax rate in host country j,  d, = dividend payout rate for subsidiary in host country j,  T” = tax rate 
on undistributed profits in host country j,  T~ = tax rate on distributed profits in host country j,  a, = 
tax credit given for advanced corporation tax in host country j. 
“or  the purpose of  this grouping, Canada has a classical system, because benefits of  corporate 
tax integration are not extended to controlling U.S. shareholders. The United Kingdom, under its 
imputation system, provides a partial credit to controlling U.S. shareholders for payment of  its 
“advanced corporation tax.” The German corporate tax system is a mixture of imputation and split- 
rate systems. Germany does not grant an imputation credit to U.S. shareholders, so we treat the 
German system as a split-rate system in constructing  the tax  price of  individual repatriations. 
Under France’s imputation credit system, the imputation credit (avoirfiscal) is not refundable to 
controlling  US. shareholders.  Japan had  a split-rate  tax  system until  1989, at which  time  it 
switched to a classical system. In its imputation system, Australia does not impose a withholding 
tax on dividends that have borne the (statutory) Australian corporate tax. For a summary of  the 
corporate tax systems in the countries in our sample, see U.S. Department of the Treasury (1992, 
appendix B). 
implied by the tax prices of repatriations summarized  in table 5.5 (see also 
Altshuler and Newlon  1993).29  The value of  td depends on whether the U.S. 
parent is in an excess limit or excess credit position. Parent firms in an excess 
limit position owe U.S. corporate tax if the U.S. corporate tax rate exceeds the 
applicable foreign tax rate. Parent firms in an excess credit position owe no 
U.S. corporate tax. Because we do not have access to the parents’ U.S. income 
tax returns, we cannot describe precisely whether the foreign tax credit limita- 
tion is binding. Instead, we assume that firms with average foreign tax rates 
above the US. corporate tax rate have excess foreign tax credits; firms with 
average foreign tax rates less than or equal to the U.S. corporate tax rate are 
assumed  to be  in  an  excess  limit  position.3o We  assume that  the  accrual- 
29. In principle, this measure should reflect  the expected tax price, because, in particular, parent 
firms may expect to transit between excess limit and excess credit status in the next period. (Evi- 
dence on the empirical significance of such transitions is presented in Altshuler et al. [chap. 9 in 
this volume].) With data on parent firms’ stocks of foreign tax credits, one could attempt to approx- 
imate the likelihood of a transition between credit states, with attendant effects on the tax price of 
repatriations. Lacking parent tax return data, we were unable to do this, however. 
30. This assumption is quite imperfect in practice, as shown in the comparison with tax data in 
Altshuler and Newlon (1993). 139  Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment 
Table 5.6  FDI Euler Equation Models (full sample) 
Model 
Test of  Overidentifying 
Adjustment Cost Parameter  Restrictions 
a  Xi 
Fixed p  Variable p  Fixed p  Variable p 
_____ 
No-tax model  ,422  ,254  24.36  32.63 
Tax model  2.01  1.86  10.23  10.61 
(.395)  (406)  (.004)  (.001) 
(.612)  (.628)  (.332)  (.303) 
Notes: The fixed p is set equal to 0.95; the variable p is defined in the text. Standard errors, in 
parentheses, are computed from a heteroskedastic-consistent matrix. Significance levels of  Han- 
sen’s test of overidentifying restrictions are in parentheses beneath the statistic. 
The sample contains 1,047 firms. The number of parent firms which report for one subsidiary 
is 786, for two subsidiaries is  109, for three subsidiaries is  13, and a single parent reports for 
four subsidiaries. 
The instrument set used for estimates above is: (I/K),  ~  3, (Z/K),  4,  (ZIK),  5, (IIIQ~, 3, (I/QZ,  ~  4. 
(I/m2,  5, (salesIK),  2, (cashJlowlK), 2.  (k + TZ),-  2, (k + 72):- 2. The instruments (ZIK),  2, and 
(Urnz,  are excluded from the set because both were found to be correlated with the error term. 
Estimates are robust to the exclusion of  lags of  (I/K) and (Z/K)*  dated before t -  3 and to the 
exclusion of (cushJlow/K),  ~  z. Estimates are robust to the inclusion of further lags of those instru- 
ments dated f -  2. 
Estimation of p and a  in the tax model using the instrument set above produced a point estimate 
on p of 0.699 with standard error 0.212 and on a  of  1.97 with standard error 0.568. The signifi- 
cance level for the test of overidentifying restrictions was 0.390. Estimation of the no tax model 
(with variable p) using an instrument set without tax terms produced a point estimate on a  of 
0.155 with standard error of 0.496. The significance level for the test of overidentifying restrictions 
was 0.002. 
equivalent tax rate on (overseas) reinvested earnings, t: is constant over time, 
allowing us to focus on changes in P.3’ 
5.5  Estimation Results 
Our estimates of the adjustment cost parameter (Y and the tests of the model’s 
overidentifying restrictions are reported in table 5.6. Four sets of results are 
reported in the table, according to whether the home-country and host-country 
tax parameters are included in the model in equation (1  l), and according to 
whether we hold p constant (“fixed p”) or use data to construct p (“variable 
p”). In all cases, the model is estimated using the panel data on investment by 
U.S. subsidiaries in Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Australia, 
and Japan described earliec3*  The instrumental variables used are described in 
the table notes. 
31. We also estimated the model assuming that r = P/2 and obtained results similar to those 
32. The results presented in table 5.6 are robust to dividing the sample into Canadian and non- 
reported below. 
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The first row reports the results under the assumption that “taxes don’t mat- 
ter”-that  is, all of  the home-country  and host-country  tax parameters are 
set equal to  The estimated values of a  of 0.42 (fixed-P case) and 0.25 
(variable$  case) are not statistically different from zero, implying implausibly 
small costs of adjusting the capital stock. Moreover, the model’s overidentify- 
ing restrictions are rejected at less than the 1 percent 
The second row reports the results when the tax parameters are included in 
the estimation equation. In contrast to the results just discussed, the estimated 
values of  CL  are now  2.01 (fixed-p case) and  1.86 (variable+  case) and are 
statistically significantly different from zero. The point estimates are qualita- 
tively similar to those reported in studies using Euler equation models to study 
U.S. investment (see, e.g., Hubbard and Kashyap 1992; Hubbard et al. 1995) 
and to those reported by Cummins et al. (chap. 7 in this volume) for domestic 
investment in a set of European countries. Also in contrast to the “taxes don’t 
matter” case, the complete model’s overidentifying restrictions are not rejected. 
We interpret the improvement in estimating the model as evidence of the im- 
portance of tax considerations in U.S. firms’ outbound FDI decisions. Estima- 
tion of p and CL in the tax model (using the same set of instruments) produces 
a point estimate of  p of  0.699, with a standard error of  0.212, and a point 
estimate of a  of  1.97. with a standard error of 0.568. The significance level for 
the test of overidentifying restrictions is 0.390. 
Table 5.7 reproduces the results presented in table 5.6 for the subsample of 
subsidiaries in the sample for all years. The estimated values of 01  are similar 
to those reported for comparable cases for the full sample in  table 5.6; the 
standard errors are larger owing to the much smaller sample of subsidiaries. 
Estimation of  p and a in the tax model (using the same set of  instruments) 
produces a point estimate of p of  0.665, with a standard error of 0.250, and a 
point estimate of  01  of  1.56, with a standard error of 0.753. The significance 
level for the test of overidentifying restrictions is 0.120. Hence, our results are 
supportive of the basic model derived in section 5.3.35 
33. This test analyses whether host-country cost-of-capital terms (i.e., (1 -  k, -  T]Z,)/(I  -  7,) 
and “international tax” parameters (it., mB  $+,/m,,,)  jointly matter. When we set mo,,+,/m,l,  equal to 
unity-in  order to examine consequences of ignoring only the “international tax” parameters- 
the estimated value of the adjustment cost parameter  CY  is 1.88 (with a standard error of  0.701), 
and the p-value for the test of overidentifying restrictions is 0.222. Given that our calculations of 
m are necessarily approximations (since, without access to tax data, we are unable to verify  the 
foreign tax credit status of parent firms), the failure to reject the model’s overidentifying restnc- 
tions in this experiment is not surprising. 
34. One must exercise some caution in relying solely on Hansen’s (1982) J-test to judge the 
adequacy of the Euler equation representation of the investment problem. Newey (1985), Ghysels 
and Hall (1990), and Oliner, Rudebusch, and Sichel (1993) have offered other diagnostic tests. 
These alternatives have generally addressed the issue of structural stability of coefficient estimates 
in time-series models. Applying these tests in the panel-data context is a topic on which we are 
currently working in this research program. 
35. Following up on n. 28, we also estimated the model converting the capital stock data into 
foreign-currency equivalents to constmct I/K. In this case (using the fixed-@  assumption in the 141  Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment 
Table 5.7  FDI Euler Equation Models (balanced panel sample) 
Test of Overidentifying 
Adjustment Cost Parameter  Restrictions 
a  X: 
Model  Fixed p  Variable p  Fixed p  Variable p 
No-tax model  .339  ,253  12.08  12.48 
Tax model  1.49  1.31  9.40  9.97 
(.401)  (.338)  (.209)  (.188) 
(.611)  (.598)  (.405)  (.353) 
Notes: The fixed p is set equal to 0.95; the variable p is defined in the text. Standard errors, in 
parentheses, are computed from a heteroskedastic-consistent  matrix. Significance levels of Han- 
sen’s test of overidentifying restrictions are in parentheses beneath the statistic. 
The sample contains 103 firms. The number of  parent firms which report for one subsidiary is 
93, and for two subsidiaries is 5. 
The instrument set for the tax model is the same as for the full sample. Estimates are robust 
to  the  exclusion  of  lags  of  (I/K) and  (I/K)* dated  before  t  - 3  and  to  the  exclusion  of 
(cash  jlowlK),  ~  *. Estimates are robust to  the inclusion of  further lags of  those instruments dated 
t -  2. 
Estimation of p and a  in the tax model using the instrument set above produced a point estimate 
on p of 0.665 with standard error 0.250 and on a  of  1.56 with standard error 0.753. The signifi- 
cance level for the test of overidentifying restrictions was 0.120. 
5.6  Discussion 
The estimation results presented  in section 5.5 offer two implications for 
analysis of tax policy beyond the simple conclusion that firms take tax incen- 
tives into account in the way suggested by standard economic theory in making 
their investments. The first implication relates to the usefulness of models such 
as equation (1  1) in measuring effects of home- and host-country tax changes 
on firms’ FDI. The second addresses the debate over whether the U.S. system 
of taxing corporate foreign-source income satisfies capital-export neutrality or 
capital-import neutrality. 
5.6.1  Measuring Tax Effects on FDI 
Using the assumptions about adjustment costs associated with new invest- 
ment employed in deriving equation (1  I), we can return to the initial experi- 
ment posed  in  section 5.2:  How  do changes in tax  parameters affect FDI 
through their impact on the tax-adjusted  q associated with that investment? 
While we cannot observe the marginal q’s to estimate this effect directly, we 
can infer the coefficient on marginal q (in a regression of Z/K on q)  from the 
results summarized in table 5.6. In particular, the coefficient on marginal q in 
such a regression can be interpreted as the reciprocal of the adjustment cost 
taxes-included case), the estimated value of the adjustment cost parameter a  is 1.62 (with a stan- 
dard error of  0.640). and the p-value for the test of overidentifying restrictions is 0.516. 142  Jason G.  Cummins and R. Glenn Hubbard 
parameter a;  the point estimate for a  of  about 2 implies a “q-coefficent”  of 
about 0.5. That is, an increase in a subsidiary’s q of 0.10 would increase the 
contemporaneous  (foreign direct) investment-capital  ratio by  0.05, a signifi- 
cant effect given the mean values for the investment-capital ratio summarized 
in table 5.2. 
Tax-induced changes in the subsidiary’s q reflect changes in host-country 
tax  rates  and  investment  incentives  and  home-country  tax  parameters  to 
the extent that the subsidiary is expected to change its dividend-paying sta- 
tus or the  parent’s foreign  tax  credit  position  (i.e.,  excess  credit  or excess 
limit) is expected to change. The marginal q for new investment by a mature 
(dividend-paying)  subsidiary  of  a  parent  in  a  stationary  foreign  tax  credit 
position  will  not  be  affected  by  permanent  changes in  home-country  tax 
 parameter^.^^ 
5.6.2  Assessing Capital-Export-Neutral and Capital-Import-Neutral 
Features of the U.S.  System 
The failure to reject the investment model derived under the assumptions of 
the tax capitalization analysis of subsidiaries’ dividend policy suggests that we 
can use that analysis to study effects of home- and host-country tax parameters 
on the cost of capital for FDL3’ In that regard, we can offer some observations 
for equity-financed  investments  in  mature  subsidiaries.  First,  if  the  home- 
country tax system is based on the residence principle with a foreign tax credit 
subject to a limitation and deferral of tax on earnings retained overseas (as in 
the case for the United States), the home-country tax on repatriations has no 
effect on subsidiaries’ investments financed out of retained earnings-as  long 
as the parent’s foreign tax credit position does not change.38  This relationship 
36. This is not strictly true if  the definition of taxable income differs across countries or if the 
home-country tax authority can tax pure profits earned abroad through effective policing of royalty 
payments and transfer-pricing arrangements (see Leechor and Mintz 1993; and Hines 1994). 
37. For analysis of the implications of the tax capitalization approach for subsidiaries’ dividend 
repatriations, see Hines and Hubbard (1990), Altshuler and Newlon (1993). and Altshuler et al. 
(chap. 9 in this volume). Because Altshuler et al. used panel data from tax returns, they were able 
to test for differences in the responsiveness of repatriations to temporary and permanent changes 
in the home-country tax price on repatriations. They find that dividend repatriations are signifi- 
cantly more responsive to temporary tax price changes than to permanent tax price changes, a 
result consistent with Hartman’s application of the tax capitalization approach. 
38. To see this, note that the cost of capital p,,,/(l  -  7,)  for a marginal investment by parent  i in 
mature subsidiary j  at time t solves 
where 
Under the assumption used in section 5.5 that r is expected to be constant, if the home- and host- 
country tax rates and the parent’s foreign tax credit position do not change, m,,, = m,,,,+,,  and the 
cost of capital is independent of the home-country tax rate. 143  Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment 
corresponds to capital-import neutrality for investments by mature subsidiaries 
of U.S. parent firms. In its most basic form, this result was first noted by Hart- 
man (1981, 1984, 1985);  Altshuler and Fulghieri (1994) generalized it to incor- 
porate the possibility of changes over time in parents’ foreign tax credit posi- 
tions. Second, the capital-import neutrality implication does not carry over to 
the case of expected changes in foreign tax credit status. If, on the one hand, 
the parent firm expected to make a once-and-for-all transition from excess limit 
status to excess credit status, the subsidiary’s cost of capital rises or falls rela- 
tive to the stationary credit case according to whether rUs  < rj or  rus  > r,, 
respe~tively.~~  If, on the other hand, the parent firm is expected to make a once- 
and-for-all transition from excess credit status to excess limit status, the cost 
of capital (ignoring withholding taxes) is independent of host-country tax pa- 
rameters, a capital-export-neutral result.40  Hence, the U.S. residence-based tax 
system with a foreign tax credit is capital-export neutral in those examples 
only in a very limited case-for  mature subsidiaries that pay no withholding 
taxes on dividend repatriations and whose parent firms are in an excess limit 
position in the period in which an investment is made and in an excess credit 
position thereafter. 
One can present similar examples (again assuming all equity finance) for 
“immature” subsidiaries, those financing initial investment using parent equity 
transfers. If the subsidiary eventually repatriates dividends, its cost of capital 
depends in part on the parent’s expected future foreign tax credit status when 
the repatriation occurs. If the parent is in an excess credit position at that time, 
the home-country tax rate does not affect investment, a capital-import-neutral 
result. If the parent is in an excess limit position at that time, the cost of capital 
will depend on both home- and host-country tax parameters. 
While these examples are only illustrative (see also the more detailed cases 
considered by Altshuler and Fulghieri 1990), they suggest the potential use- 
fulness of firm-level panel data to test the appropriateness of the tax capitaliza- 
tion approach’s predictions about the responsiveness of  subsidiary dividend 
and investment decisions to tax changes. 
39. To see this, note that the cost of capital (under the assumptions described inn. 38) is given by 
Hence, if T~~ >  7,. the cost of capital falls relative to the stationary credit case; if TUs <  T~,  the cost 
of capital rises relative to the stationary credit case. For example, given the increase in the likeli- 
hood of parents’ moving from an excess limit position to an excess credit position after the cut in 
T~~ in the Tax Reform Act of  1986, U.S. FDI would be expected to increase in high-tax countries 
and decrease in low-tax countries, ceteris paribus. 
40.  To see this, note the cost of capital (under the assumptions described in n. 38) is given by 
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5.7  Conclusions 
This paper represents a first step in a research program to use microdata on 
multinational  firms’ overseas investment decisions to study the determinants 
of FDI, especially those related to tax policy. In that sense, our exercise is in 
the spirit of an attempt to use microdata to test models of  the effects of tax 
parameters on subsidiaries’ dividend repatriation decisions. The panel data that 
we use on FDI of subsidiaries of U.S. firms permit us to focus on “new invest- 
ment,”  something  not possible with the  more commonly studied aggregate 
data. These data also allow us to test structural models of investment decisions, 
thereby giving us potentially informative estimates of the effects of tax param- 
eters on FDI. 
We believe we have been successful in two respects. First, we have extended 
conventional investment models to accommodate a wide range of tax influ- 
ences on FDI decisions. Second, our empirical results cast significant doubt on 
the simplest notion that “taxes don’t  matter” for U.S. firms’ FDI decisions. 
Tax parameters influence FDI in precisely the ways indicated by neoclassical 
models. Our results also lend support to the application of the tax capitalization 
model to the study of dividend repatriation and FDI decisions. 
Much work remains, however. First, because of  data limitations, we were 
forced to make a number of simplifying assumptions in estimating our model. 
In future work, we plan to test the sensitivity of our findings to plausible alter- 
native assumptions. Second, we are working to extend our analysis to study 
effects of tax policy on U.S. inbound FDI. Third, we plan to test whether shifts 
in the host-country  currency value of  firms’ investments affect firms’ FDI, 
holding constant other determinants of FDI. Finally, we would like to incorpo- 
rate imperfect competition and intangible assets in our approach. 
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Comment  David G. Hartman 
When asked to comment on this ambitious paper, which I like very much, I 
had to first decide whether to comment as the author of  Hartman (1984), to 
which these authors were very generous in their discussion, or in my 1994 role 
as an advisor to companies in setting global business strategy. I chose the latter, 
at the expense of the former. I intend to point out some puzzles in the data and 
then provide some (I hope, realistic) parables about business decisions that 
might explain the puzzles. In doing so, I aim to cast doubt on the strength of 
the empirical results, but any criticism will reflect badly on my own previous 
work. Finally, I will discuss the possibility that exchange rate translation  is 
driving the paper’s empirical results. 
As introduction, I want to make a point about the very simple short-time- 
series analysis of  Hartman (1984) and the “subsequent rounds of replication 
and refinement” cited by the authors. In  the  1970s only a few economists, 
including Robert Lipsey and Martin Feldstein at NBER, were  interested in 
foreign direct investment (FDI). That was not surprising, since FDI was small, 
and though growing was doing so only moderately. Most particularly, it was 
plausible  at that time that the historical pattern in FDI was the result of  an 
equilibrium process of some kind. Around the end of the time periods I was 
researching, a quite different dynamic took over. FDI, both inward and out- 
ward, grew at an extraordinary pace, culminating in the situation in 1994 of 
nearly every company seeing global expansion as its key to growth. It should 
have been anticipated that the empirical literature, which takes as its point of 
departure responses to changes in the marginal profitability of  international 
operations, would be unsuccessful  in linking this later period  of  incredible 
growth  with the earlier period of  small and relatively  stable FDI. In other 
words, history provides one major discontinuity to explain, and the existing 
models provide little hope of  explaining it. I sometimes wonder whether in- 
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cluding a time series of the number of times “globalization” appears in Busi- 
ness Week might be the answer. 
That brings me to the distinction between the paper’s conceptual model and 
some business decisions that I believe are incorporated in the data. The paper’s 
model describes a rather simple world. This is a world in which FDI increases 
or declines as companies adjust to a new equilibrium rate of return available 
in a specific location. 
Alternatively, one can view the foreign investment decision as a lumpy pro- 
cess of  one-time strategic decisions on how to serve an emerging market or 
change the locus of production. Since the data the authors carefully construct 
look like the aggregation of a series of  investment  surges, one must be con- 
cerned about just this kind of  issue. If  the empirical investigation deals with 
firms observed in their startup phase or in a major building phase, the predicted 
relationship between investment and observed rates of return  should be quite 
different. But before getting into details, I want to comment on some of  the 
puzzles raised by the data. 
Puzzles 
To  explain why  I think that a more “realistic”  model of a start-up foreign 
subsidiary is needed, I refer to the volatility and the timing of the data included 
in the paper. Even looking at averages by country, we find that it is not uncom- 
mon for the capital stock to grow by  10 percent one year and 40+ percent the 
next, or for the cash flow as a fraction of invested capital to go from 10 to 30+ 
percent and then back to 10 percent over three years. This volatility is puzzling 
unless these data reflect start-up operations, or unless some other phenomenon 
(such as a foreign exchange effect) is at work, a point I will return to later. 
The timing of movements in the data, even at a crude aggregate level, is even 
more puzzling.  For example,  the aggregate  of  the  German  subsidiaries in- 
cluded in the data had a great year in 1982, a recessionary year and a time of 
poor  performance  across  a broad  range  of  indigenous  German  companies. 
While it is not  a fair criticism to take the authors’ model literally, it seems 
legitimate to question why, in an equilibrium model of investment, U.S.-owned 
companies would in aggregate have a pattern of return and investment so dis- 
similar to that of indigenous German firms. 
It is also interesting that in nearly all of the countries examined, the naked 
eye can tell from a simple graph that aggregate sales lead aggregate investment, 
usually by  a year (see fig. XI).  I have trouble thinking of the traditional in- 
vestment model being consistent with this pattern when the changes in sales 
are so large. In the neoclassical model, improved sales increase capacity utili- 
zation and encourage investment, but it is hard to imagine stretching capacity 
so far. The answer, of course, is that the German subsidiary is only a part of the 
company’s operation and sales in Germany can easily increase without extra 
production in Germany. In light of the voltality of the data, it is easy to specu- 




Fig. 5C.1  Investment and sales: German subsidiaries 
Source: Cumins  and Hubbard (chap. 5 in this volume, tables 5.2  and 5.4). 
vesting to establish a substantial local presence for the first time or to dramati- 
cally increase its size. This phenomenon might be consistent with what the 
authors are hoping to capture, though a more appropriate model would be one 
that weighs the cash-flow effects of  producing in different locations, rather 
than treating the German subsidiary in isolation. Most important is whether 
this calls into question the empirical conclusions about taxes. That depends 
critically on how  a company making such strategic moves would report its 
investment and cash flow in the “separate, new” market, as I will discuss. 
Parables 
One possible conclusion is that the data are describing a set of investment 
surges representing new operations or major increases in the size of existing 
foreign operations. We would expect most truly new foreign ventures to begin 
with an unprofitable investment period, quite probably lasting for years, fol- 
lowed by  a payback period. If  that is what we  are observing, we  should be 
surprised not to get perverse results from regressions of investment on profit- 
ability or cash flow. 
To  see how the “confirming” results reported here could arise, we can turn 
to several business parables. In one fairly common situation, a “separate, new” 
foreign operation might be set up to provide better service to an established 
base of  sales. As opposed to our expectation of  an initial period of losses in a 
true start-up operation, we would not necessarily be surprised to see this type 
of FDI accompanied by  high rates of  return, as the existing sales base is as- 
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functions. This  would  also be  consistent  with  the  fact  that  sales lead  in- 
vestment. 
Similarly, successful managers  are often given responsibility  for a wider 
geographic area. Thus, on average a profitable operation tends to be assigned 
responsibility for making and managing new investments. With a sample so 
limited in detail about a firm’s multiple operations in a region, this possibility 
is difficult to evaluate. 
We could continue to speculate but the point is that there are many possibili- 
ties besides the phenomenon being modeled here to explain the association of 
profitability and investment, and they might do better in explaining some of 
the puzzles in the data. 
Foreign Exchange 
A more straightforward concern is the impact of exchange rates. The authors 
have addressed whether the companies’ translation of subsidiary data into dol- 
lars was done at consistent points in time. But the much more important ques- 
tion is whether the act of translating into dollars has itself produced a spurious 
association between investment and cash flow. 
The dollar was of course highly volatile in the decade of the 1980s, appar- 
ently having had a major impact on the observations used in this paper. Look- 
ing at table 5.2, for example, we see the dollar-denominated capital stock in 
Germany staying flat as the dollar soared in the early  1980s, surging as the 
dollar plunged  during  1985-87,  and growing at a reasonable,  modest pace 
thereafter as the dollar stabilized. We would need to know more than we or the 
authors do about the original currency of  denomination  of the companies’ 
books and the details of their operations to be certain, but this series has all the 
earmarks of a capital stock that grew steadily at just about 15 percent per year 
in deutsche marks. That is, virtually all of the year-to-year change in the capital 
stock (i.e., the variation in investment) could apparently have been produced 
by exchange rate changes. 
The authors indicate in footnote 35 that they have been able to address the 
most obvious problem-creating  an investment series by differencing capital 
stocks already translated into dollars. Though the authors’ alternative estimates 
are not described in detail, it would appear that foreign exchange effects could 
still be driving the investment data. Changing the dollar-reported capital stock 
into “foreign-currency equivalents” before differencing it to construct invest- 
ment is a good check, since it should reduce the potential for the most extreme 
spurious volatility in investment caused by the dollar. But even translating a 
perfect deutsche mark-denominated  investment series into dollars would still 
incorporate the dollar’s movement in measured investment. In addition, any 
adjustment back to foreign currencies of  figures that are reported in dollars 
by  the companies is dangerous, since we have little information about their 
translation process. The data also provide only general guidance about where 
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in which the “subsidiary is located”). So, any currency adjustment undertaken 
by researchers in constructing investment series is highly problematic. 
Knowing how exchange rates affect the cash flow of these operations is even 
more of a question. We  cannot tell the difference even between the two ex- 
tremes: a subsidiary that incurs local costs to produce products sold in the 
United States and a subsidiary that sells locally those products produced in the 
United States. It  is at least plausible, though, that translating cash flow  in 
deutsche marks into dollars has created a spurious pattern of movement closely 
related to a spurious pattern of movement in investment. 
I would conclude that the set of results in the main body of the text shows 
distinct signs of being driven by exchange rate translation. As I have noted, the 
authors report some additional work done to mitigate the most obvious prob- 
lem, but I would hardly call the case closed. That having been said, the problem 
is the common one of trying to make the most of very crude data; I can only 
admire the authors’ clever leveraging of the poor information available and 
applaud their attempts to verify their results. 
Taxes 
So far none of my comments relate to the most striking part of  the paper: 
that the measures incorporating taxes work, and work significantly better than 
those without. This lends support to the importance of  taxes and to the tax 
capitalization model that is so near to my heart. 
Much as I support the authors’ strategy of plunging ahead with limited infor- 
mation, the tax measures are obviously crude. First, they are country specific 
but in large measure neither industry nor financing specific. Previous work has 
shown tax rates to vary far more by industry and by financing method than by 
country (or, for that matter, through time for most countries). It is remarkable, 
then, that rather crude measures (again, however, the best that can be done with 
the data available) are so successful in explaining company behavior. 
Is there any obvious alternative explanation of why these measured tax rates 
“work”? Without seeing the detail of the tax rates, it is hard to speculate, but 
we do know some things. First, 1986 was the big event in terms of variation in 
rates over time. The U.S. tax reform made a striking change toward excess 
credit status for most firms. That year also coincided with major exchange rate 
realignments, so there is a superficial plausibility to some coincident exchange 
rate effect having been captured by taxes. To carry speculation further, the tax 
change was least significant for operations in Canada, where tax rates followed 
the U.S. rates down in the 1980s. Canada was also the only country with only 
minor exchange rate changes. 
The more important point is that even before reading the paper we knew 
that the 1986 tax change did indeed coincide with the beginning of a big surge 
in U.S. investment abroad. But it also coincided with the beginning of a world- 
wide surge in foreign investment that has been the subject of a great deal of 
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unconnected with the U.S.  tax reform. It is a mystery that if solved might shed 
some light on whether there is some other phenomenon at work here . . . one 
that simply coincides with the US.  tax reform. 
The final comment is that my  criticisms are directed  toward the specific 
period under study and the potential problems related to the time-series aspects 
of  the analysis. In fact, this work is an important beginning with firm-level 
panel data that has potential to bring a qualitative improvement in our under- 
standing of the foreign investment process. Additional tests may prove that the 
time-series dimension of  the data (especially exchange rate changes and the 
maturing of  subsidiaries) is not driving the results. I hope that it does. In any 
event, this promising line of work is extremely time consuming but also path 
breaking, in a field that has been focused on simple time-series models. Previ- 
ous simple time-series analysis cannot hope to shed light on this phenomenon 
that has obviously undergone some dramatic and little-understood shift during 
the interval of observation. This paper makes real progress toward better under- 
standing. 
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